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Mirela Minică 
Prerequisites of the Passage to a Regime of 
Inflation Targeting  
The  article  synthetically  presents  the  main  prerequisites  of  the 
institutional and technical order we should consider in the context of 
the National Bank’s adopting a complex policy of inflation targeting. 
1. Institutional requirements 
The absolute priority of the inflation goal  
The institutional commitment to price stability implies that monetary policy 
should have been assigned a clear mandate by which this goal might acquire a 
fundamental  character  and  priority  compared  to  other  goals,  such  as  economic 
growth, external competitiveness or increase of employment rate. 
The independence of the Central Bank in the use of instruments  
The  regime  of  direct  inflation  targeting  supposes  an  increased  degree  of 
independence  of  the  central  bank  in  managing  the  monetary  policy.  At  the 
institutional level, it means the existence of a law stipulating the independence of 
the Board of Directors of the central bank (appointed for a long term and protected 
against  arbitrary  revocation)  towards  the  government  and  granting  the  central 
bank the exclusive and complete control in the choice and application of monetary 
policy instruments. 
Harmonizing the monetary policy with the fiscal policy  
The de facto independence of the central bank – defined by the liberty to 
use the instruments at its disposal in the manner it considers fit for reaching its 
goal  –  is  restricted  by  the  presence  of  fiscal  domination,  which  distorts  the 
efficiency  of  the  monetary  policy  measures.  As  long  as  the  monetary  policy 
operates in an environment where the advantage of the first move is given to the 
fiscal policy, the action range of the central bank is considerably narrowed (Niepelt, 
2001). 
Its independence is complete only if the operational framework assures the 
precedence  of  the  inflation  target  upon  the  goals  of  fiscal  nature.  In  such  a 
context, the fiscal policy should adjust behaviour so that it does not endanger the 
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inflation  goal,  which  is  equivalent  to  the  absence  of  any  symptoms  of  fiscal 
dominance (Masson et al., 1998): (i) the financing of the direct public deficit by the 
central bank or the banking system should  be reduced or even absent, (ii) the 
government  should  not  depend  on  the  senior  age  revenues,  (iii)  the  internal 
financial markets should be sufficiently developed to allow the transaction of public 
or private credit instruments, (iv) the level of public debt should be sustainable. 
Unless these conditions are met, the persistence of fiscal misbalances will 
generate inflation pressures, which will undermine the efficiency of the monetary 
policy  in  reaching  any  nominal  target,  imposing  it  an  accommodating  attitude. 
Masson  et  al.(1998)  considers  that  in  a  country  registering  for  a  period  of  3 5 
years annual inflation rates of 5 20 %, the monetary and the fiscal policy  are 
practically inseparable, the central bank not being able to accomplish all by itself 
the significant and sustainable reduction of inflation. 
The  fiscal  consolidation  necessary  to  the  implementation  of  a  regime  of 
direct  inflation  targeting  essentially  depends  however  on  the  existence  of  fiscal 
discipline.  Manifested by the failure to pay the obligations towards the State or the 
acceptance of a lax salary policy at the level of the state companies with losses, 
the  fiscal  indiscipline  contributes  to  the  escalation  of  budgetary  deficits  beyond 
sustainable limits; the imperative of financing the above exceeds the inflation goal 
and  questions  the  main  condition  of  the  functioning  of  the  inflation  targeting 
regime. 
 
A well developed financial system  
The  underdevelopment  of  capital  markets  stresses  the  effects  of  fiscal 
domination.  Economies  with  difficulties  in  accessing  the  international  capital 
markets, with a reduced level of saving and a financial system lacking depth, limit 
the possibilities of the government to get loans on the internal market, the senior 
age and other forms of financial repression being the only options. Under these 
circumstances,  the  financial  markets  cannot  supply  information  regarding  the 
medium term inflation forecast, necessary to the central bank in order to elaborate 
the  strategy  of  direct  inflation  targeting,  and  the  institutions  of  financial 
intermediation, which in general have an aversion against inflation and inflation 
policies, do not have the strength to exercise pressure upon authorities for the 
observance of the commitments made, if the implemented policies tend to deviate 
from the set inflation goal. The frailty of the  banking system represents also a risk 
factor  to  the  success  of  a  strategy  of  direct  inflation  targeting,  increasing  the 
possibility that the central bank might sacrifice the inflation goal in order to avoid a 
system crisis. 
Nevertheless, the recent experience of certain countries with developing or 
transition economies proves that the implementation of the inflation targeting is 
compatible also with a less advanced state of financial markets’ maturation. From 
the perspective of these experiences, the existence of a developed financial system   251 
constitutes a factor which facilitates the implementation of the inflation targeting, 
without being however a sine qua non condition. 
 
Flexible exchange rate  
An additional aspect that might raise serious problems for the strategy of 
direct inflation targeting is the phenomenon of dollarisation, which characterizes, in 
many cases, the emergent markets. 
The flexibility of the nominal exchange rate is a requirement of the inflation 
targeting regime deriving from the setting as priority goal the inflation targeting. 
Nevertheless the associated risks are not negligible, considering that the abrupt 
depreciation may trigger the increase of the burden of the denominated debt in 
dollars, and the appreciation of the currency may produce the deterioration of the 
commercial  balance.  In  this  context,  the  implementation  of  the  direct  inflation 
targeting in partially dollarised economies should be preceded by the introduction 
of certain strict prudential regulations and of an efficient supervision of financial 
institutions, which may assure the capacity of the system to absorb the shocks of 
the exchange rate. 
 
Transparency and liability  
The  transparency  of  the  monetary  policy  is  extremely  useful  to  a  central 
bank with a firm anti inflation orientation.  If the bank is firm in the anti inflationist 
behavior, the public communication of its goals, instruments, procedures, decisions 
and forecasts strengthens its credibility, simultaneously with the increase of the 
degree of liability to the public.  The repeated reaching of the announced targets 
generates reputation gains, the public support to the independence of the central 
bank  increasing  even  in  the  absence  of  a  rigorous  framework  for  assessing  its 
performances. 
The explicit announcement of a numerical inflation target diminishes the risk 
of dynamic inconsistency in two ways (Mishkin, 2000): 
(a) on the one hand, the communication of the target is equivalent to entrusting 
the central bank with a mandate for the use in this purpose of the instruments of 
monetary policy, both the market and the political milieus being aware that the 
short term goals (economic growth, unemployment reduction) will not prevail the 
one regarding inflation; 
(b) on the other hand, the public assuming of the inflation target strengthens the 
capacity of the central bank to resist the possible political pressures regarding the 
promotion of an expansionist monetary policy. 
2. Technical requirements 
Beyond  the  institutional  requirements,  the  adoption  of  a  regime  of  direct 
inflation  targeting  supposes  the  solving    of  certain  technical  aspects  (Debelle, 
1997): the choice of an adequate price index (representative for the purchasing   252 
power of money and easily understood by the  public); the  explicit setting  of  a 
quantitative target, of the interval of accepted fluctuation and of the time horizon 
during which one will supervise the goal setting; the building by the central bank 
of a performant model of inflation prognosis 
 
The choice of an adequate price index 
The  choice  of  the  price  index  according  to  which  the  inflation  target  is 
established depends on the methodological characteristics of the calculation of the 
consuming prices index and of its sensitivity to shocks from the part of supply. The 
second  criterion  is  more  important  in  the  transition  countries  aiming  at 
implementing a regime of inflation targeting where the incidence of administered 
prices  on  the  general  level  of  prices  is  high.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
application of a strategy of direct inflation targeting imposes either a very good 
communication  between  the  monetary  and  the  fiscal  authorities  as  regards  the 
moment and magnitude of the controlled prices modification, or the elimination of 
their effect upon the target index. In their attempt to grasp the influence of the 
non monetary  factors,  many  countries  practicing  the  direct  inflation  targeting 
define their goal at the level of basis inflation, the excluded elements of the total 
IPC  being  different  from  one  case  to  another.  (Enclosure  1).  The  decision  of 
establishing the goal at the level of basic inflation should nevertheless consider the 
fact that such a methodology is not easily understood and assimilated by the wide 
public; consequently, the putting into practice of the decision should be preceded 
by an information campaign ensuring the transparency of the goal and the public 
support for the new strategy. 
 
The fluctuation range and the target horizon  
a) The width of the target band. The need to specify the band width results from 
the imperfect control of the monetary policy upon the inflation rate. As a result of 
long and variable lags of the mechanism of monetary policy transmission, and of 
the imperfect capacity to forecast inflation, it is not possible to restrict inflation 
variability below certain levels.  
Moreover, the band is necessary for the maintenance of a certain flexibility 
of the monetary policy as regards the reaction to short term shocks. The choice of 
the target band dimension reflects a compromise between the announcement of a 
narrow band, with the risk of occasionally exceeding it, and the announcement of a 
width band, that can be perceived as a too relaxed attitude of the monetary policy. 
A narrow band reflects a firm position of the central bank in the observance of the 
goal of price stability, but it can become difficult to be implemented in practice, 
with repercussions on the credibility of monetary authority. On the other hand, 
adopting a narrow band has the advantage of stressing short term liability of the 
central bank in reaching the inflation target , but may trigger instability at the level 
of  monetary  policy  instruments  –  in  order  to  obtain  a  given  effect  upon  the 
inflation rate. The shorter the time horizon, the greater the intervention amplitude.   253 
The width of the target band (or its very existence) represents a difference 
among the regimes of inflation targeting adopted in different countries (Enclosure 
1). As regards the Central and Eastern Europe’s countries which have adopted a 
direct inflation targeting, their majority defined its goal in terms of band, its size 
being gradually restrained along with the progress registered in the disinflation (for 
instance, the Czech Republic started in 1998 with a ±0,5 percent band at a 6% 
inflation rate, and in 2000 the fluctuation rate was narrowed to  ±0 percent at a 
4.5% target rate). 
  b) The time horizon. The establishment of the target horizon essentially 
depends on the initial level of inflation and on the duration of the transmission 
mechanism. In Canada and New Zealand, for instance, authorities benefited from 
an allowed delay of 8 months for the reaching of the initial target. The following 
targets were set at shorter intervals (2 months), but once the inflation reduced to 
an  acceptable  long term  level,  both  countries  established  that  the  goal  will  be 
followed by assuring the ranging within the band, at any moment, for a 5 year 
horizon.   Similarly, the medium term strategy of monetary policy in Poland sets at 
the year the horizon of inflation targets reaching, but it mentions that it will be 
extended in parallel with the increase of the period of economy’s reaction to the 
central bank actions (in the context of a low inflation and of the diversifying of 
financial markets). 
 
The capacity of inflation prognosis  
The performance by the central bank of an inflation prognosis is essential in 
a regime of  inflation  targeting,  considering the anticipating character of such  a 
monetary policy strategy.   
The elaboration of a satisfying prognosis depends however on the existence 
of  certain  consistent  historic  series  allowing  the  estimation  of  a  stable  relation 
between inflation and the other macroeconomic variables 
3. Anti-inflationist policies  
It is necessary to be well aware of the existence of transmission mechanism 
of  monetary  impulses  and  of  a  financial  markets  able  to  supply,  in  due  time, 
correct information to the central bank, as a response to its actions. Moreover, so 
that it does not become recursive, the prognosis effected within the central bank 
should not incorporate anticipations regarding its actions on which prognoses of 
other institutions rely. 
Among  the  measures  generally  constituting  the  object  of  anti inflationist 
governmental policies we may list: 
  a) Deflation, by which the state aims at blocking or tempering the price 
increase,  as  well  as  the  increase  of  the  purchasing  power  of  currency  by 
diminishing the quantity of currency in circulation. 
The forms of deflation are:   254 
  1. Monetary, consisting in restraining the circulating monetary mass, this 
process  is  carried  on  through  the  annulment  of  the  payment  means  or  their 
conversion into a certain ratio, for instance: 20 to 1 (monetary reform – n.n); 
  2.  Financial,  consisting  in  paying  the  state  debt  to  the  central  bank  or 
adopting policy through budgetary exceeding, obtained by diminishing the public 
expenses and the increase of income taxes, respectively; 
  3. Of credit, consisting in increasing the level of interests or in diminishing 
the bank loans granting.” 
  Although considered a radical measure, deflation is usually accompanied 
by a reduction of economic activity. The lack of liquidities, braking the merchandise 
circulation,  brusquely  created,  the  non confirmation  of  inflationist  anticipations 
regarding the evolution of prices of companies having built their supply plans from 
this  perspective  are  only  two  aspects  leading  to  the  contradictory  effects  of 
deflation. 
  b) Re-valuing is the measure by which the state aims at returning the 
national currency to its initial, higher rate. It is an anti inflationist measure to the 
extent to which it re establishes the trust in the currency. Is also has a negative 
effect, as it makes exports more expensive and thus it reduces the possibility of 
acquiring hard currency with negative consequences upon imports. 
  c) De-valuing means the legal adaptation of the official, higher exchange 
rate of national  currency, to the lower one of the market. It has a positive element 
the  fact  that  it  makes  export  cheaper.  Moreover,  it  leads  to  a  resettlement  of 
prices  on  the  basis  of  criteria  resulting  from  the  true  value  ratios  indicated  by 
practical reality. De valuing may however generate untruth in the currency, when 
it is not correlated with measure of output increase, budgetary balance assurance, 
rigorous control of monetary issues and of their thorough coverage. 
  d) Manoeuvring the discount tax, or directly, the interest rate. As a 
form of interest existence, the discount may be used as an instrument of struggle 
against inflation. One starts from the premise that through credit one mainly feeds 
the channels of monetary circulation. „Strangling” this access way is possible only 
by making loan more expensive. As the loan price, eventually, is the very discount 
or interest rate, it is obvious that one will proceed to the increase of their level. 
  e)  Reducing  indirect  income  taxes  and  taxes.  Since  the  ‘80s  the 
measure  has  constituted,  together  with  the  increase  of  the  interest  rate  and  a 
moderate  monetary  issue  in  accordance  and  at  the  same  rhythm  with  that  of 
economic growth, the object of an official economic policy, known as the policy or 
the doctrine of supply.  Its promoters, especially A. Laffer, stress the stimulation of 
output, of supply. In full accordance with the Say Law, they consider it normal that 
supply is easily created as the monetary issue is a State’s monopoly; the money, 
irrespective of its form, once brought into economy, means potential supply. Offer, 
or output is more difficult to achieve. Or, a way of stimulating it means in this 
vision reducing fiscality. Besides the fact that high indirect taxes become a part of 
logically higher prices, they also suffocate the company’s life. The partisans of the   255 
doctrine of supply proved that by the very company’s getting rid of the burden of a 
high fiscality, the State has the opportunity to cash in more from this source: one 
considers a low taxation rate applicable to an increasingly high taxable mass, in its 
turn the result of an increasing turnover. 
  f) Prices indexing, the establishment of an interdependence ratio with 
that of incomes and purchasing power. One mainly considers here the effect of 
stability that such a measure may induce to the economic and social climate.  
  g) Reduction of budgetary deficits  
  The  range  of  anti inflation  measures  is  not  exhausted  by  those  listed 
above. According to the place and time, the nature of inflation and especially the 
amplitude  of  the  phenomenon,  each  state  builds  the  strategy  that  best  fits  its 
situation.  Although  certain  measures  are  common  in  almost  all  governmental 
policies, it is important to retain that the anti inflation policy, as well as the anti 
unemployment  policy,  by  which  it  is  usually  accompanied,  acquires  specific 
characteristics, in relation with the range it circumscribes. Romania does the same. 
Facing  a  tough  inflation,  it  searches  for  solutions  best  designed  to  respond  its 
economic specific. 
4. Conclusions 
Under the present economic circumstances, when the impact of the interest 
rate  on  the  money  demand  seems  more  reduced  than  in  functional  market 
economies,  and  at  the  macroeconomic  level  there  are  still  weak  budgetary 
constraints,  the  targeting  of  a  certain  interest  rate  in  economy  would  be 
unoperational. 
The choice of the anchor of monetary policy aims at defining an indicator 
able  to  maximize  its  efficiency,  under  the  circumstances  specific  to  market 
economy,. The intervention of the central bank is essentially indirect and is mainly 
focused on one of the monetary indicators, but also influences the behavior of the 
other indicators, on the principle of communicating vessels. The anchor used by 
the National Bank was the monetary basis, and the effect was the expected one, in 
the plane of inflation control. The insufficient convergence of the economic policy 
mix  attracted  unwanted  evolutions,  either  as  regards  the  interest  rate,  or  the 
exchange rate. 
Aware of the limited impact of its actions on the interest rates in the context 
of  focusing  upon  the  monetary  basis  control,  the  National  Bank  attempted 
however, beginning with mid 1998, to imprint a descendent trend to the interest 
rates. The market did not validate this attempt as it was not in accordance with 
the general economic framework and did not correspond to the expectations of 
market operators. Consequently, the market returned soon to high interest rates. 
This experience would allow us to draw the following conclusions:   256 
  The  monetary  market  is  functioning  and  its  forces  prevail  on  certain 
actions  of  the  central  bank  that  are  insufficiently  supported  by  the  economic 
conditions. 
  The central bank has a limited capacity to simultaneously control several 
monetary variables. In the case at hand, the reduction of the interest rates is not 
possible  if  the  inflationist  expectations  are  high,  the  saving  is  poor  and  the 
financing of the public deficit is made from internal resources. 
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